The equity premium -the difference between the expected return on the market portfolio of common stocks and the riskfree interest rate -is important in portfolio allocation decisions, estimates of the cost of capital, the debate about the advantages of investing Social Security funds in stocks, and many other applications. The average return on a broad portfolio of stocks is typically used to estimate the expected market return. The average real return for 1872-2000 on the S&P index (a common proxy for the market portfolio, also used here) is 8.81% per year. The average real return on six-month commercial paper (a proxy for the riskfree interest rate) is 3.24%. This large spread (5.57%) between the average stock return and the interest rate is the source of the so-called equity premium puzzle: stock returns seem too high given the observed volatility of consumption (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) .
We use fundamentals (dividends and earnings) to estimate the expected stock return. Along with other evidence, the expected return estimates from fundamentals help us judge whether the realized average return is high or low relative to the expected value.
The logic of our approach is straightforward. The average stock return is the average dividend yield plus the average rate of capital ga in,
A(R t ) = A(D t /P t-1 ) + A(GP t ), where D t is the dividend for year t, P t-1 is the price at the end of year t-1, GP t = (P t -P t-1 )/P t-1 is the rate of capital gain, and A( ) indicates an average value. (Throughout the paper, we refer to D t /P t-1 as the dividend yield and D t /P t is the dividend-price ratio. Similarly, Y t /P t-1 , the ratio of earnings for year t to price at the end of year t-1, is the earnings yield and Y t /P t is the earnings-price ratio.)
Suppose the dividend-price ratio, D t /P t , is stationary (mean reverting). Stationarity implies that if the sample period is long, the compound rate of dividend growth approaches the compound rate of capital gain. Thus, an alternative estimate of the expected stock return is,
A(RD t ) = A(D t /P t-1 ) + A(GD t ), where GD t = (D t -D t-1 )/D t-1 is the growth rate of dividends. We call (2) the dividend growth model.
The logic that leads to (2) applies to any variable that is cointegrated with the stock price. For example, the dividend-price ratio may be non-statio nary because firms move away from dividends toward share repurchases as a way of returning earnings to stockholders. But if the earnings-price ratio, Y t /P t , is stationary, the average growth rate of earnings, A(GY t ) = A((Y t -Y t-1 )/Y t-1 ), is an alternative estimate of the expected rate of capital gain. And A(GY t ) can be combined with the average dividend yield to produce another estimate of the expected stock return,
A(RY t ) = A(D t /P t-1 ) + A(GY t ).
We call (3) the earnings growth model. 1 We should be clear about the expected return concept targeted by (1), (2), and (3). D t /P t and Y t /P t , vary through time because of variation in the conditional (point-in-time) expected stock return and the conditional expected growth rates of dividends and earnings (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1989) . But if the stock return and the growth rates are stationary (they have constant unconditional means), D t /P t and Y t /P t are stationary. Then, like the average return (1), the dividend and earnings growth models (2) and (3) provide estimates of the unconditional expected stock return. In short, the focus of the paper is estimates of the unconditional expected stock return.
The estimate of the expected real equity premium for 1872-2000 from the dividend growth model (2) is 3.54% per year. The estimate from the average stock return, 5.57%, is almost 60% higher. The difference between the two is largely due to the last fifty years. The equity premium for 1872-1950 from the dividend growth model, 4.17% per year, is close to the estimate from the average return, 4.40%. In contrast, the equity premium for 1951-2000 produced by the average return, 7.43% per year, is almost three times the estimate, 2.55%, from (2). The estimate of the expected real equity premium for 1951-2000 from the earnings growth model (3), 4.32% per year, is larger than the estimate from the dividend growth model (2). But the earnings growth estimate is still less than 60% of the estimate from the average return.
Three types of evidence suggest that the lower equity premium estimates for 1951-2000 from fundamentals are closer to the expected premium. (i) The estimates from fundamentals are more precise.
For example, the standard error of the estimate from the dividend growth model is less than half the standard error of the estimate from the average return.
(ii) The Sharpe ratio for the equity premium from the average stock return just about doubles from 1872-1950 to 1951-2000 . In contrast, the equity premium from the dividend growth model has a similar Sharpe ratio for 1872-1950 and 1951-2000. (iii) Most important, valuation theory specifies relations among the book-to-market ratio, the return on investment, and the cost of equity capital (the expected stock return). The 1951-2000 estimates of the expected stock return from the dividend and earnings growth models line up with other fundamentals in the way valuation theory predicts. But the book-to-market ratio and the return on investment suggest that the expected return estimate from the average stock return is too high.
Our motivation for the dividend growth model (2) is simpler and more general, but (2) can be viewed as the expected stock return estimate of the Gordon (1962) model. Our work is thus in the spirit of a growing literature that uses valuation models to estimate expected returns (e.g., Blanchard, 1993 , Claus and Thomas, 2000 , Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2000 . Claus and Thomas (2000) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2000) use forecasts by security analysts to estimate expected cash flows. Their analyst forecasts cover short periods (1985-1998 and 1979-1995) . We use realized dividends and earnings from 1872 to 2000. This 129-year period provides a long perspective, which is important for judging the competing expected return estimates from fundamentals and realized stock returns. Analyst forecasts are also subject to substantial optimism bias (Claus and Thomas, 2000) . The average growth rates of dividends and earnings we use are unbiased estimates of expected growth rates.
Like us, Blanchard (1993) uses dividend growth rates to estimate the expected rate of capital gain, which he combines with an expected dividend yield to estimate the expected stock return. But his focus is different and his approach is more complicated than ours. He is interested in the path of the conditional expected stock return. His conditional expected return is the sum of the fitted values from time-series regressions of the realized dividend yield and a weighted average of 20 years of future dividend growth rates on four predetermined variables (the dividend yield, the real rate of capital gain, and the levels of interest rates and inflation). He focuses on describing the path of the conditional expected return in terms of his four explanatory variables.
In contrast, our prime interest is the unconditional expected return, which we estimate more simply as the sum of the average dividend yield and the average growth rate of dividends or earnings. This approach is valid if the dividend-price and earnings-price ratios are stationary. And we argue below that it continues to produce estimates of the average expected stock return when the price ratios are subject to reasonable forms of non-stationarity. Given its simplicity and generality, our approach is an attractive addition to the research toolbox for estimating the expected stock return.
Moreover, our focus is comparing alternative estimates of the unconditional expected stock return over the long 1872-2000 period, and explaining why the 1951-2000 expected return estimates from fundamentals are much lower than the average return. Our evidence suggests that much of the high return for 1951-2000 is unexpected capital gain, the result of a decline in discount rates.
Specifically, the dividend-price and earnings price ratios fall from 1950 to 2000; the cumulative percent capital gain for the period is more than three times the percent growth in dividends or earnings.
All valuation models agree that the two price ratios are driven by expectations about future returns (discount rates) and expectations about dividend and earnings growth. Confirming Campbell (1991) , Cochrane (1994) , and Campbell and Shiller (1998) , we find that dividend and earnings growth rates for 1950-2000 are largely unpredictable. Lik e Campbell and Shiller (1998) , we thus infer that the decline in the price ratios is mostly due to a decline in expected returns. Some of this decline is probably expected, the result of reversion of a high 1950 conditional expected return to the unconditional mean. But most of the decline in the price ratios seems to be due to the unexpected decline of expected returns to ending values far below the mean.
The paper proceeds as follows. The main task, addressed in sections I and II, is to compare and evaluate the estimates of the unconditional annual expected stock return provided by the average stock return and the dividend and earnings growth models. Section III then considers the issues that arise if the goal is to estimate the long-term expected growth of wealth, rather than the unconditional expected annual (simple) return. Section IV concludes. Without showing the details, we can report that the CRSP value-weight portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks produces average returns and dividend growth estimates of the expected return close to the S&P estimates for periods after 1925 when both indices are available. What one takes to be the riskfree rate has a bigger effect. For example, substituting the one-month Treasury bill rate for the six-month commercial paper rate causes estimates of the annual equity premium for 1951-2000 to rise by about 1.00%. But for our main task -comparing equity premium estimates from (1), (2), and (3) -differences in the riskfree rate are an additive constant that does not affect inferences.
I. The Unconditional Expected Stock Return
One can estimate expected returns in real or nominal terms. Since portfolio theory says the goal of investment is consumption, real returns seem more relevant, and only results for real returns are shown.
Because of suspicions about the quality of the price deflator during the early years of 1872-2000, we have replicated the results for nominal returns. They support all the inferences from real returns.
The dividend and earnings growth models (2) . This is in line with formal evidence (Fama and French, 1988; Cochrane, 1994; Lamont, 1998 ) that the market dividend-price ratio is highly autocorrelated but slowly meanreverting. S&P earnings data for the early years of 1872-2000 are of dubious quality (Shiller, 1989 If there is a permanent shift in the expected stock return, it is non-stationary, but like the average return in
(1), the dividend and earnings growth models in (2) and (3) estimate the average expected return during the sample period.
Indeed, an advantage of the expected return estimates from fundamentals is that they are likely to be less sensitive than the average return to long-lived shocks to dividend and earnings growth rates or the expected stock return. For example, a permanent shift in the expected return affects the average dividend yield, which is common to the three expected return estimates. But it produces a shock to the capital gain term in the average return in (1) that is not shared by the estimates in (2) and (3). In short, the estimates of the expected stock return from fundamentals are likely to be more precise than the average stock return.
A. The Equity Premium
For much of the 1872-2000 period -up to about 1950 -the dividend growth model and the average stock return produce similar estimates of the expected return. Thereafter the two estimates diverge.
To illustrate, Table 1 than half the average return, 9.62%. The dividend growth estimate of the equity premium, 2.55%, is 34% of the estimate from returns, 7.43%. The 1951-2000 estimates of the expected stock return and the equity premium from the earnings growth model, 6.51% and 4.32%, are higher than for the dividend growth model. But they are well below the estimates from the average return, 9.62% and 7.43%.
B. Evaluating the Expected Return Estimates for 1951-2000
We judge that the estimates of the 1951-2000 expected stock return from fundamentals are closer to the true expected value, for three reasons.
(i) The expected return estimates from the dividend and earnings growth models are more precise than the average return. The standard error of the dividend growth estimate of the expected return for 1951-2000 is 0.74%, versus 2.43% for the average stock return. Since earnings growth is more volatile than dividend growth, the standard error of the expected return from the earnings growth model, 1.93%, is higher than the estimate from the dividend growth model. But it is smaller than the 2.43% standard error of the average stock return. Claus and Thomas (2000) also argue that expected return estimates from fundamentals are more precise than average returns, but they provide no direct evidence.
(ii) Table 1 shows Sharpe ratios for the three equity premium estimates. Only the average premium in the numerator of the Sharpe ratio differs for the three estimates. The denominator for all three is the standard deviation of the annual stock return. The Sharpe ratio for the dividend growth estimate of the 1872-1950 equity premium, 0.22, is close to that produced by the average stock return, 0.23. More (iii) Most important, the behavior of other fundamentals favors the dividend and earnings growth models. The average ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity for 1951-2000 is 0.66, the book-to-market ratio B t /P t is never greater than 1.12, and it is greater than 1.0 for only six years of the 50-year period. Since on average the market value of equity is substantially higher than its book value, it seems safe to conclude that on average the expected return on investment exceeds the cost of capital.
Suppose investment at time t -1 generates a stream of equity earnings for t, t+1,.., t+N with a constant expected value. The average income return on book equity, A(Y t /B t-1 ), is then an estimate of the expected return on equity's share of assets. It is an unbiased estimate when N is infinite and it is upward biased when N is finite. In either case, if the expected return on investment exceeds the cost of capital, we should find that (except for sampling error) the average income return on book equity is greater than estimates of the cost of equity capital (the expected stock return),
A(Y t /B t-1 ) > E(R). Table 1 shows that (4) is confirmed when we use the dividend and earnings growth models to estimate the expected real stock return for 1951-2000. The estimates of E(R), 4.74% (dividend growth model) and 6.51% (earnings growth model), are below 7.60%, the average real income return on book equity, A(Y t /B t-1 ). In contrast, the average real stock return for 1951-2000, 9.62%, exceeds the average income return by more than 2.0%. An expected stock return that exceeds the expected income return on book equity implies that the typical corporate investment has a negative net present value. This is difficult to reconcile with an average book-to-market ratio substantially less than 1.0.
To what extent are our results new? Using analyst forecasts of expected cash flows and a more complicated valuation model, Claus and Thomas (2000) Given the strong optimism bias of analyst forecasts of earnings growth, it is surprising that the expected return estimates of Claus and Thomas (2000) are low, like our estimates from observed growth.
The key is their assumption that each year, new investment more than five years ahead earns only the cost of capital. In effect, they offset the positive bias of analyst growth forecasts with a conservative assumption about longer-term growth. When (for purposes of illustration) they extrapolate the actual growth forecasts of analysts, their equity premium estimates are higher, like those from realized returns (their table III). One could thus argue that in fact analyst forecasts imply high expected returns. At a minimum, the sensitivity of the expected return estimates of Claus and Thomas (2000) to assumptions about long-term growth makes their results difficult to judge. (Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2000, use a similar approach, subject to the same problems).
II. Unexpected Capital Gains
Valuation growth rates.) Suppose D t /P t and E t /P t were the same in 1950 and 2000. Then the total percent growth in dividends and earnings during the period would be the same as the percent growth in the stock price. And
(1), (2) and (3) would provide similar estimates of the expected stock return.
It is worth dwelling on this point. There is probably survivor bias in the U.S. average stock return for 1872-1950, as well as for 1951-2000. During the 1872-2000 period, it was not a foregone conclusion that the U.S. equity market would survive several financial panics, the Great Depression, two world wars, and the cold war. The average return for a market that survives many potentially cataclysmic challenges is likely to be higher than the expected return (Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross, 1995) . But if the positive bias shows up only as higher than expected dividend and earnings growth during the sample period, there is similar survivor bias in the expected return estimates from fundamentals -a problem we do not solve. Our more limited goal is to explain why the average stock return for 1951-2000 is so high relative to the expected return estimates from the dividend and earnings growth models.
Since unexpected growth for 1951-2000 has a similar effect on the three expected return estimates, the task of explaining why the estimates are so different falls to the end-of-sample values of future expected returns and expected dividend and earnings growth. We approach the problem by first looking for evidence that expected dividend or earnings growth is high at the end of the sample period. We find none. We then argue that the large spread of capital gains over dividend and earnings growth for 1951-2000, or equivalently, the low end-of-sample dividend-price and earnings-price ratios, are due to an unexpected decline in expected stock returns to unusually low end-of-sample values.
B. Are Post-2000 Expected Dividend and Earnings Growth Rates Unusually High?
The behavior of dividends and earnings provides little evidence that rationally assessed (i.e., true)
long-term expected growth is high at the end of the sample period. If anything, the growth rate of real dividends declines during 1951-2000 (Table 2 ). The average growth rate for the first two decades, 1.60%, is higher than the average growth rates for the last three, 0.68%. The regressions in Table 3 are more formal evidence on the best forecast of post-2000 real dividend growth rates. Regressions are shown for forecasts one year ahead (the explanatory variables for year t dividend growth are known at the end of year t-1) and two years ahead (the explanatory variables are known at the end of year t-2).
The regression for 1875-1950 suggests strong forecast power one year ahead. The slopes on the lagged payout ratio, the dividend-price ratio, and the stock return are close to or more than two standard errors from zero, and the regression captures 38% of the variance of dividend growth. Even in the 1875-1950 period, however, power to forecast dividend growth does not extend much beyond a year. When dividend growth for year t is explained with variables known at the end of year t-2, the regression R 2 falls from 0.38 to 0.01. Without showing the details, we can report that extending the forecast horizon from two to three years causes all hint of forecast power to disappear. Thus, for 1875-1950, the best forecast of dividend growth more than a year or two ahead is the historical average growth rate. forecast horizons. Our evidence that dividend growth is essentially unpredictable during the last fifty years confirms the results in Campbell (1991 ), Cochrane (1991 , 1994 , and Campbell and Shiller (1998) . If dividend growth is unpredictable, the historical average growth rate is the best forecast of future growth. The regressions in Table 3 are formal evidence on the predictability of 1951-2000 earnings growth. There is some predictability of near-term growth, but it is largely due to transitory variation in earnings that is irrelevant for forecasting long-term earnings. In the 1951-2000 regression to forecast earnings growth one year ahead, the slope on the first lag of the stock return is positive (0.28, t = 2.39), but the slope on the second lag is negative (-0.25, t = -2.18) and about the same magnitude. Thus, the prediction of next year's earnings growth from this year's return is reversed the following year. In the 1951-2000 one-year forecast regression, the only variable other than lagged returns with power to forecast earnings growth (t = -2.54) is the third lag of earnings growth. But the slope is negative, so it predicts that the strong earnings growth of recent years is soon to be reversed.
In the 1951-2000 regression to forecast earnings one year ahead, there is a hint (t= -1.91) that the low earnings -price ratio at the end of the period implies higher than average expected growth one year ahead. But the effect peters out quickly; the slope on the lagged earnings-price ratio in the regression to forecast earnings growth two years ahead is -1.02 standard errors from zero. The only variables with forecast power two years ahead are the second lag of the stock return and the third lag of earnings growth.
But the slopes on these variables are negative, so again the 2000 prediction is that the strong earnings growth of recent years is soon to be reversed. And again, regressions (not shown) confirm that forecast power for 1951-2000 does not extend beyond two years. Thus, beyond two years, the best forecast of earnings growth is the historical average growth rate.
In sum, the behavior of dividends for 1951-2000 suggests that future growth is largely unpredictable, so the historical mean growth rate is a near optimal forecast of future growth. Earnings growth for 1951-2000 is somewhat predictable one and two years ahead, but the end-of-sample message is that the recent high growth rates are likely to revert quickly to the historical mean. It is also worth noting that the market survivor bias argument of Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) suggests that past average growth rates are, if anything, upward biased estimates of future growth. In short, we find no evidence to support a forecast of strong future dividend or earnings growth at the end of our sample period.
C. Do Expected Stock Returns Fall during the 1951-2000 Period?
The S&P dividend-price ratio, D t /P t , falls from 7.18% at the end of 1950 to a historically low shows that the 1979 earnings-price ratio, 13.40%, is nearly identical to the 13.39% value of 1950.)
All valuation models say that D t /P t and E t /P t are driven by expected future returns (discount rates) and expectations about future dividend and earnings growth. Our evidence suggests that rational forecasts of long-term dividend and earnings growth rates are not unusually high in 2000. We conclude that the large spread of 1951-2000 capital gains over dividend and earnings growth is largely due to a decline in the expected stock return.
Some of the decline in D t /P t and E t /P t during 1951-2000 is probably anticipated in 1950. The dividend-price ratio for 1950, 7.18%, is high (Figure 1) In short, the percent capital gain for 1951-2000 is several times the growth of dividends or earnings. The result is historically low dividend-price and earnings-price ratios at the end of the period.
Since the ratios are high in 1950, some of their subsequent decline is probably expected, but much of it is unexpected. Given the evidence that rational forecasts of long-term growth rates of dividends and earnings are not high in 2000, we conclude that the unexpected capital gains for 1951-2000 are largely due to a decline in the discount rate. In other words, the low end-of-sample price ratios imply low (rationally assessed, or true) expected future returns.
Like us, Campbell (1991 ), Cochrane (1994 , and Campbell and Shiller (1998) find that for recent periods, dividend and earnings growth are largely unpredictable, so variation in dividend-price and earnings-price ratios is largely due to the expected stock return. The samples in Campbell (1991) and Cochrane (1994) end in 1988 (before the strong subsequent returns that produce sharp declines in the price ratios), and they focus on explaining, in general terms, how variation in D t /P t splits between variation in the expected stock return and expected dividend growth. Campbell and Shiller (1998) focus on the low expected future returns implied by the low price ratios of recent years.
In contrast, we are more interested in what the decline in the price ratios says about past returns, specifically, that the average return for 1951-2000 is above the expected return. And this inference does not rest solely on the information in price ratios. We buttress it with two types of novel evidence. (i) The perspective from our long sample period that, although the average stock return for 1951-2000 is much higher than expected return estimates from fundamentals, the two approaches produce similar estimates for 1872-1950. (ii) Evidence from Sharpe ratios, the book-to-market ratio, and the income return on investment, which also suggests that the average return for 1951-2000 is above the expected value.
III. Estimating the Expected Stock Return: Issues
There are two open questions about our estimates of the expected stock return. (i) In recent years the propensity of firms to pay dividends declines and stock repurchases surge. How do these changes in dividend policy affect our estimates of the expected return? (ii) Under rather general conditions the dividend and earnings growth models (2) and (3) provide estimates of the expected stock return. Are the estimates biased and does the bias depend on the return horizon? This section addresses these issues.
A. Repurchases and the Declining Incidence of Dividend Payers
Share repurchases surge after 1983 (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Dunsby, 1995) , and after 1978 the fraction of firms that do not pay dividends steadily increases (Fama and French, 2000) . More generally, dividends are a policy variable, and changes in policy can raise problems for estimates of the expected stock return from the dividend growth model. There is no problem in the long-term, as long as dividend policies stabilize and the dividend-price ratio resumes its mean-reversion, though perhaps to a new mean.
(An appendix, available on request, provides an example involving repurchases.) But there can be problems during transition periods. For example, if the fraction of firms that do not pay dividends steadily increases, the market dividend-price ratio is probably non-stationary; it is likely to decline over time, and the dividend growth model is likely to underestimate the expected stock return.
Fortunately, the earnings growth model is not subject to the problems posed by drift in dividend policy. The earnings growth model provides an estimate of the expected stock return when the earningsprice ratio is stationary. And as discussed earlier, the model provides an estimate of the average expected return during the sample period when there are permanent shifts in the expected value of Y t /P t , as long as the ratio mean-reverts within regimes. 
B. The Investment Horizon
The return concept in discrete time asset pricing models is a one-period simple return, and our empirical work focuses on the one-year return. But many if not most investors are concerned with longterm returns, that is, terminal wealth over a long holding period. Do the advantages and disadvantages of different expected return estimates depend on the return horizon? This section addresses this question.
The Expected Annual Simple Return
There is downward bias in the estimates of the expected annual simple return from the dividend and earnings growth models -the result of a variance effect. The expected value of the dividend growth estimate of the expected return, for example, is the expected value of the dividend yield plus the expected value of the annual simple dividend growth rate. The expected annual simple return is the expected value of the dividend yield plus the expected annual simple rate of capital gain. If the dividend-price ratio is stationary, the compound rate of capital gain converges to the compound dividend growth rate as the sample period increases. But because the dividend growth rate is less volatile than the rate of capital gain, the expected simple dividend growth rate is less than the expected simple rate of capital gain.
The standard deviation of the annual simple rate of capital gain for 1951-2000 is 3.29 times the standard deviation of the annual dividend growth rate (Table 1) . The resulting downward bias of the average dividend growth rate as an estimate of the expected annual simple rate of capital gain is roughly 1.28% per year (half the difference between the variances of the two growth rates). Corrected for this bias, the dividend growth estimate of the 1951-2000 equity premium in simple returns rises from 2.55 to 3.83% (Table 4) , which is still far below the estimate from the average return, 7.43%. Since the earnings growth rate and the annual rate of capital gain have similar 1951-2000 standard deviations, 13.79% and 16.77% (Table 1) , the bias of the earnings growth estimate of the expected return is smaller (0.46%). Corrected for bias, the estimate of the 1951-2000 equity premium from the earnings growth model rises from 4.32 to 4.78% (Table 4) , which again is far below the 7.43% estimate from the average return.
Long-Term Expected Wealth
The ( In contrast, if the dividend growth rate is unpredictable and the dividend-price ratio is stationary, part of the higher volatility of annual rates of capital gain is transitory, the result of a mean-reverting expected annual return (Cochrane, 1994) . Thus, compounding even the true unconditional expected annual simple return, E(R), yields an upward biased measure of the expected compounded return,
There is a similar problem in using the average (simple) earnings growth rate to estimate longterm expected wealth. The regressions in Table 3 suggest that the predictability of earnings growth for 1951-2000 is due to transitory variation in earnings. As a result, annual earnings growth is 2.71 times more volatile than dividend growth (Table 1) . The compound growth rate of earnings for 1951-2000, 1.89%, is 2.05 times the compound dividend growth rate, 0.92%. But because earnings are more volatile, the average simple growth rate of earnings, 2.82%, is 2.69 times the average simple growth rate of dividends, 1.05%. As a result, the average simple growth rate of earnings produces an upward biased estimate of the compound rate of growth of long-term expected wealth.
We can correct the bias by subtracting half the difference between the variance of earnings growth and the variance of dividend growth (0.82%) from the average earnings growth rate. The estimate of the expected rate of capital gain provided by this adjusted average growth rate of earnings is 2.00% per year.
Using this adjusted average growth rate of earnings, the earnings growth estimate of the expected real stock return for 1951-2000 falls from 6.51 to 5.69%. The estimate of the equity premium falls from 4.32 to 3.50% (Table 4) , which is closer to the 2.55% obtained when the average dividend growth rate is used to estimate the expected rate of capital gain. Similarly, adjusting for the effects of transitory return volatility causes the estimate of the equity premium from realized stock returns to fall from 7.43% to 6.16%, which is still far above the bias-adjusted estimate of the earnings growth model (3.50%) and the estimate from the dividend growth model (2.55%).
Finally, we only have estimates of the expected growth rates of dividends and earnings and the expected rate of capital gain. Compounding estimates rather than true expected values adds upward bias to measures of expected long-term wealth (Blume, 1974) . The bias increases with the imprecision of the estimates. This is another reason to favor the more precise estimate of the expected stock return from the dividend growth model over the earnings growth estimate or the estimate from the average stock return.
VI. Conclusions
There is a burgeoning literature on the equity premium. Our main additions are on two fronts. (i)
A long perspective on the competing estimates of the unconditional expected stock return from fundamentals (the dividend and earnings growth models) and the average stock return.
(ii) Evidence (estimates of precision, Sharpe ratios, and the behavior of the book-to-market ratio and the income return on investment) that allows us to choose between the expected return estimates from the two approaches.
Specifically, the dividend growth model and the realized average return produce similar real equity premium estimates for 1872 -1950 , 4.17% and 4.40%. For the half-century 1951 -2000 , however, the equity premium estimates from the dividend and earnings growth models, 2.55% and 4.32%, are far below the estimate from the average return, 7.43%.
We argue that the dividend and earnings growth estimates of the 1951-2000 equity premium are closer to the true expected value. This conclusion is based on three results.
(i) The estimates from fundamentals, especially the estimate from the dividend growth model, are more precise; they have lower standard errors than the estimate from the average return.
(ii) The appealing message from the dividend and earnings growth models is that aggregate risk aversion (as measured by the Sharpe ratio for the equity premium) is on average roughly similar for the 1872-1949 and 1950-1999 periods. In contrast, the Sharpe ratio for the equity premium from the average return just about doubles from 1872-1950 to 1951-2000. (iii) Most important, the average stock return for 1951-2000 is much greater than the average income return on book equity. Taken at face value, this says that investment during the period is on average unprofitable (its expected return is less than the cost of capital). In contrast, the lower estimates of the expected stock return from the dividend and earnings growth models are less than the income return on investment, so the message is that investment is on average profitable. This is more consistent with bookto-market ratios that are rather consistently less than 1.0 during the period. Many papers suggest that the decline in the expected stock return is in part permanent, the result of (i) wider equity market participation by individuals and institutions and (ii) lower costs of obtaining diversified equity portfolios from mutual funds (Diamond, 1999; Heaton and Lucas, 1999; Siegel, 1999) .
But there is also evidence that the expected stock return is slowly mean reverting (Fama and French, 1989; Cochrane, 1994) . Moreover, there are two schools of thought on how to explain the variation in expected returns. Some attribute it to rational variation in response to macroeconomic factors (Fama and French, 1989; Blanchard, 1993; Cochrane, 1994) , while others judge that irrational swings in investor sentiment are the prime moving force (e.g., Shiller, 1989) . Whatever the story for variation in the expected return, and whether it is temporary or partly permanent, the message from the low end-of-sample dividend-price and earnings-price ratios is that we face a period of low (true) expected returns.
Our main concern, however, is the unconditional expected stock return, not the end-of-sample conditional expected value. Here there are some nuances. If we are interested in the unconditional expected annual simple return, the 1951-2000 estimates from fundamentals are downward biased. The bias is rather large when the average growth rate of dividends is used to estimate the expected rate of capital gain, but it is small for the average growth rate of earnings. On the other hand, if we are interested in the long-term expected growth of wealth, the dividend growth model is probably best, and the average stock return and the earnings growth estimate of the expected return are upward biased. But our bottom line inference does not depend on whether one is interested in the expected annual simple return or longterm expected wealth. In either case, the bias-adjusted expected return estimates for 1951-2000 from fundamentals are a lot (more than 2.6% per year) lower than bias-adjusted estimates from realized returns.
(See Table 4 .) Based on this and other evidence, our main message is that the unconditional expected equity premium of the last fifty years is probably far below the realized premium. ) is the real dividend yield. R t = D t /P t-1 + GP t is the realized real return on the S&P portfolio. RD t = D t /P t-1 + GD t and RY t = D t /P t-1 + GY t are the estimates of the return for t from the dividend and earnings growth models. RX t = R t -F t , RXD t = RD t -F t , and RXY t = RY t -F t are the three estimates of the real equity premium for t. A(RX t ), A(RXD t ), and A(RXY t ) are the average values of the equity premium estimates. The first column of the table shows unadjusted estimates of the annual simple equity premium. The second column shows bias-adjusted estimates of the annual premium. The bias adjustment is one-half of the difference between the variance of the annual rate of capital gain and the variance of either the dividend growth rate or the earnings growth rate. The third column shows bias-adjusted estimates of the expected equity premium relevant if one is interested in the long-term growth rate of wealth. The bias adjustment is one-half of the difference between the variance of the annual dividend growth rate and the variance of either the growth rate of earnings or the rate of capital gain. The equity premiums are expressed as percents. 
